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Running Head: Resource Security 
 
 




We develop a resource security perspective by examining the resources that multinational firms 
acquire when investing abroad. Firms can acquire resources to increase power and decrease dependence for 
long-term security (exploration) or acquire resources for relatively shorter-term gains and consumption 
(exploitation). We find state owned enterprises (SOEs) acquire resources for exploration, and pay more for 
these resources than non-state owned enterprises (NSOEs). We contribute to the literature by suggesting 
that long-term resource security is of immediate importance to SOEs and their home countries, that 
ownership influences resource acquisitions, and investments can be a safeguard for the SOE’s home 
country’s future. 
 
Keywords: energy, oil and gas, resource dependence theory, securing natural resources, state owned 
enterprises 
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State owned enterprises (SOEs) have an increasing presence in global markets and are more 
powerful than ever (Büge, Egeland, Kowalski, & Sztajerowska, 2013; Marcel, 2006). This is especially true 
in “strategic industries” or industries specific to the extraction or treatment of natural resources, particularly 
energy (Kowalski, Büge, Sztajerowska, & Egeland, 2013; Marcel, 2006). In these and other industries, 
SOEs are competing head-to-head with other SOEs as well as non-state owned enterprises (NSOEs)—and 
are proving to be fierce competitors. For example, in the global petroleum industry, SOEs control an 
estimated 90% of the world’s oil and gas reserves and are responsible for approximately 75% of the world’s 
oil and gas reserves production (Tordo, Tracy, & Arfaa, 2011). With stable financial backing from their 
home country governments, SOEs are rising national champions that compete for more than just 
wealth maximization. SOEs are also concerned with “wealth re-distribution, jobs creation, general 
economic development, [and] economic and energy security” (Pirog, 2007: 1). SOEs, operating as foreign-
policy instruments of their government owners, compete to enhance long-term viability, geopolitical 
position, and power of the home country government. Thus, the strategic activities in which SOEs engage 
must satisfy both business intent through wealth maximization and political intent through geopolitical 
position and power of the home country government (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Zif, 1981, 1983). 
How SOEs acquire resources, especially valuable, natural resources, is of immense importance to 
their home governments (Chang, 2007). For SOEs, natural resources are important because they can boost 
economic and national security while raising geopolitical power of the home country.  Using Resource 
Dependence Theory (RDT), firms with access to and equity ownership in the most natural resources have 
less of a need, and therefore less dependence, on other firms (and counties) for these resources (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013). The desire of SOEs for reduced dependence on other firms 
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and countries for natural resources is apparent across industries focused on natural resources—SOEs have 
a 34% share in the extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas sector, a 35% share in the mining of coal 
and lignite sector, and a 40% share in the land transport and transport via pipelines sector (Kowalski et al., 
2013). The strong presence of SOEs across these sectors indicates that SOEs are increasing their presence 
(and power) (Büge et al., 2013). However, a more nuanced approach to why these SOEs have strong 
presence in these industries, and their strategic activities, remain in question. As such, is it more important 
for SOEs to invest in these resources for the long-term to secure future access to them (resource security), 
or do SOEs need these resources for short-term security just to be exploited for consumption? 
To address this question, we utilize the exploration vs. exploitation framework (He & Wong, 2004; 
Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991; Uotila, Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2009). Although this framework is 
traditionally used to better understand knowledge management, innovation, organizational design, and 
strategic alliances, much can be gained from extending this framework’s application to other arenas (Lavie, 
Stettner, & Tushman, 2010). For example, Voss et al (2008: 147) generalize the exploration vs. exploitation 
framework to examine product repertoire in nonprofit theaters. In doing so, they broadly suggest that there 
is a “higher level of risk inherent in exploratory activities, which require significant investments with 
uncertain payoffs (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). Exploitation creates value through existing or minimally 
modified competencies that sustain longterm viability following successful exploration” (citation in 
original). In this paper we utilize this logic underlying the exploration vs. exploitation framework to 
examine the broad strategic emphasis of multinational firms (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003; Voss et al., 
2008) and argue that these two strategic activities are instrumental in dictating how multinationals acquire 
resources. By integrating the exploration vs. exploitation framework with RDT, we offer that multinationals 
can either search or discover these resources to increase power and decrease dependence for long-term 
security (exploration) or produce and refine these resources for relatively shorter-term security and 
consumption (exploitation) (Gaille, 2010; Karev, 2013).  
Because SOEs attend to both business and political intents, they are more concerned with resource 
security through exploration of resources than resource consumption by virtue of exploitation of resources. 
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This is because once discovered through exploration activities, the SOE can hold the resources in reserve 
to satisfy future demand of their home country. More importantly, however, by having access to these 
resources, the SOE has increased its geopolitical position and power by decreasing its future dependence 
on other firms and countries for these same resources (Gaille, 2010). Conversely, SOEs are less concerned 
with exploiting resources for consumption because once consumed, the resource, and its strategic benefits 
including power, geopolitical position, and economic gains, are also depleted. Our primary arguments are: 
(1) multinationals with a greater extent of state ownership are more likely to acquire resources for 
exploration to enhance resource security, (2) multinationals with a greater extent of state ownership pay 
more for resources for exploration because resource security is important to them, and (3) the target 
country’s resource-richness and the multinational’s experience in the target country influence the above-
mentioned relationships because they both provide more abundant opportunities for the multinational to 
enhance resource security. In addition, we suggest that heterogeneity exists among SOEs such that SOEs 
with more exploration experience are more likely to acquire resources for exploration. 
To examine these relationships, we use the global upstream petroleum industry as the setting for 
our study. This industry is appropriate because, in the words of French industrialist and Senator, Henri 
Berenger, “he who owns the oil will own the world.” This statement echoes the sentiment that firms (and 
countries) with access to valuable resources, such as oil, have the most power and least dependence on 
other firms (and countries) for these resources. This is because petroleum (oil) is one of the world’s most 
important energy resources (US Department of Energy, 2012), needed across the world in developed and 
especially developing economies (BP, 2012; CIA Factbook, 2010). Yet, for firms operating in this industry, 
gaining access to petroleum resources is difficult for several reasons. First, competition for these non-
renewable resources is increasing as demand increases (EIA, 2012a). Second, petroleum resources are 
unevenly dispersed across the globe, which requires many firms to operate as multinationals. Third, the 
industry is a complex web of numerous players ranging from governments and state owned enterprises (also 
termed National Oil Companies, NOCs) to non-state owned publicly-traded and privately-held firms. 
Despite this, firms in this industry acquire petroleum resources through exploration or exploitation 
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activities. Exploration (search for availability of petroleum) and exploitation (petroleum production) are 
both necessary activities in the petroleum industry, and activities in which firms can choose to engage in 
either or both.  
Our study offers several implications for theory. First, we examine how multinationals with state 
ownership pursue resource security through the resources they acquire. Our findings illustrate that the 
strategic emphasis of SOEs is to acquire resources for exploration. For some multinationals, resources that 
secure the firm’s (or home country’s) future are worth more than those resources that can be exploited for 
consumption to provide relatively short-term gains. These multinational secure resources to decrease their 
resource dependence (thus ensuring their resource independence) in the future. Second, we highlight how 
ownership differences influence the attitudes of multinationals toward reducing resource dependence and 
increasing geopolitical power with the objective of achieving greater resource security. State ownership 
typically orients firms to secure resources in a way that will ensure resource independence and geopolitical 
power for the home country in the future. Third, we explain why multinationals investing abroad to acquire 
resources can be beneficial for the home country. At surface-level, an investment abroad by a multinational 
appears as an investment lost at home. However, we suggest that while the investment outflow might be 
perceived as a short-term loss for the home country, the investment abroad can help the SOE acquire 
resources to secure the country’s future. In sum, SOEs are under pressure to build economic value outside 
the home country to secure its future. This pressure to align their priorities with that of home country drives 
SOEs to adopt a multi-polar view of resource acquisition.  
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE AND RESOURCE SECURITY 
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) is traditionally used to investigate why and how firms 
operating in the same environment vie for external resources from a finite resource pool. Firms with the 
most resources have the most power and the least dependence on other firms, and firms with the least 
resources and power have the most dependence on other firms (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). External 
resources are created or exist outside the boundaries of the firm, can be located in a multitude of geographic 
locations, and therefore may be dispersed unevenly. Operating across borders to gain access to external 
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resources exposes multinationals to layers of complexity beyond those experienced by domestic firms 
(Crilly, 2011; Wry et al., 2013). Multinationals, like domestic firms, are concerned with obtaining the rights 
to, or acquiring, resources from the external environment. However, unlike domestic firms, multinationals 
are also concerned with gaining access to locations in which these resources exist (Luo, 2003).  
A “recent renaissance of resource dependence” (Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008): p. 321) 
stems from theoretically engaging in the theory’s core insights (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Katila et al., 
2008))—differences in intents among firms contribute to differential access to external resources and power 
(Wry et al., 2013). In this study, we specifically examine how owners influence the intents of multinationals, 
which undergird resource acquisitions and related firm activities. Owners provide the necessary support, 
including capital, to facilitate a multinational firm’s activities directed toward acquiring externally available 
resources. During these activities, the intent of the firm should align with the directions provided by the 
owners (Demsetz, 1983; Wry et al., 2013). The owner can dictate the intent of the firm, and subsequently 
influence how and where the firm competes to acquire resources. 
Once resources are acquired, they can be secured through exploration, or made for consumption 
through exploitation activities. In its traditional flavor, the exploration vs. exploitation framework (March, 
1991) is used to describe activities related to the development of knowledge resources where exploration is 
associated with long-term benefits and exploitation with short-term (He & Wong, 2004; March, 1991; 
Uotila et al., 2009). As applied to knowledge, Levinthal and March (1993: 105) suggest exploration is “a 
pursuit of new knowledge,” and exploitation is “the use and development of things already known.” The 
exploration vs. exploitation framework suggests that firms search, discover, or experiment to explore for 
(internal) knowledge resources (exploration) or produce, refine, and execute to exploit (internal) knowledge 
resources (exploitation) (March, 1991). However, exploration or exploitation activities can be for resources 
other than knowledge (Lavie et al., 2010). Adopting this broad description, exploration is a pursuit of new 
resources that are not known to exist and exploitation is the production of resources already known to exist 
(Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001).  
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Using insights from RDT, we develop a resource security perspective by examining how firms 
secure resources across the world through exploration or exploitation activities. We suggest that firms can 
either search or discover external resources to increase power and decrease dependence for long-term 
security (exploration) or produce and refine external resources for relatively shorter-term security through 
consumption (exploitation). Conventionally, RDT argues for increasing power by reducing dependency. 
However, it is largely silent on the intent with which firms acquire and secure resources. More specifically, 
it does not indicate whether resources are secured with the intent of consumption or as a safeguard for the 
future. We attempt to fill this theoretical gap by developing a resource security perspective. We suggest 
that firms view resource security differently, and pursue resource security differently. On the one hand, 
firms strategizing for the short-term acquire resources to satisfy short-term needs, such as consumption, 
and do so through exploitation activities. On the other hand, firms strategizing for the long-term acquire 
resources to achieve resource security by converting their current resource dependence (i.e., dependence on 
external/foreign entities that hold the resources) into future resource independence through exploration 
activities.  
STATE OWNED VERSUS NON-STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 
To develop a resource security perspective, we highlight the relevance of multinational SOEs and 
their strategies in the international business landscape. SOEs operate under an economic logic of state 
capitalism in which both political and business goals dominate where and how these firms compete 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Zif, 1981). Contrastingly, NSOEs operate under the logic of market 
capitalism, and operate solely with business intent. Business intent requires both SOEs and NSOEs to attend 
to market incentives, including pursuit of wealth maximization. However, SOEs and NSOEs pursue wealth 
for differing purposes. NSOEs pursue wealth for maximization of shareholder value (Gaille, 2010; 
Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Thus, NSOEs must focus on short-term profitability and return on investment 
for shareholders. Rather than fulfill demands of shareholders, SOEs maximize wealth so that it can be 
redistributed in the home country to create jobs and fund economic development (Pirog, 2007). Thus, SOEs 
compete to ensure long-term viability and profitability for themselves and their home country governments. 
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In addition to business intent, SOEs also operate with a political intent (Zif, 1981). Political intent 
requires SOEs to operate in a way that supports general economic development and energy security (Pirog, 
2007). As such, SOEs are subject to political demands projected by their government owners (Gaille, 2010). 
This may require the SOE to be sensitive to political interests and public accountability (Mascarenhas, 
1989; Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002). SOEs are also concerned with goals of government owners in 
terms of ensuring energy security in the present and the future, as well as attaining foreign and strategic 
policy goals for the government owner (Gaille, 2010). Thus, many SOEs operate to support the state and 
enhance the government’s geopolitical position and the home country’s power (Bradshaw, 2009; Bremmer, 
2009; Luo & Tung, 2007).  
In addition to differences in intents, SOEs and NSOEs also differ in access to financial capital and 
efficiency considerations, both of which influence the activities they choose to pursue. Many SOEs have 
state owners with relatively strong capital backing (Katusa, 2012) and can gain financial resources through 
loan guarantees from their state owners (governments) (Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; Lioukas, Bourantas, 
& Papadakis, 1993). This makes capital intensive projects and industries more accessible (Lin, Cai, & Li, 
1998). Further, SOEs are often less efficient than their NSOE counterparts, This creates more difficulties 
for SOEs to create positive returns from projects and operations requiring efficiency (Bremmer, 2009; 
Gaille, 2010; Lin et al., 1998; Wurgler, 2000). Avoiding activities that require efficient operation safeguards 
the SOE against marginal returns and wealth depletion—both of which threaten the business intent of the 
SOE.  
Competition between State Owned and Non-State Owned Enterprises for Resources 
State ownership influences likelihood of acquiring resources for exploration. We suggest that SOEs 
are more likely to acquire resources for exploration (resource security) than exploitation (resource 
consumption). SOEs need to satisfy the political intents of their home country governments, which are 
generally concerned with long-term viability (Katusa, 2012; Musacchio & Flores-Macias, 2009; 
Musacchio  & Sergio G. Lazzarini, in press). Exploration activities are associated with long-term returns 
(He & Wong, 2004; Uotila et al., 2009; Voss et al., 2008), and thus may better support resource security 
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for SOEs and their home countries. The notion that exploration efforts are directed toward long-term, rather 
than short-term, goals is supported by a statement made by an executive of ARC Financial, a capital venture 
firm, in reference to firm investments in resources for exploration: “A dollar spent today is typically felt 
five-to-10 years hence.”  
Given this directed focus among SOEs on the future, resources that enhance the home country’s 
long-term viability through future power by way of decreased dependence {Emerson, 1962} and 
geopolitical position are of high priority. Considering that exploitation follows exploration (Lavie et al., 
2010; Voss et al., 2008), exploration of resources now provides potential to exploit resources in the future. 
That is, resources can be secured now through exploration efforts to be exploited in the future for 
consumption. Exploration of resources provides SOEs the flexibility to wait to exploit the resources until 
they are needed (i.e. when they are needed to satisfy home country demand) (Kaplowitz, 2004). Thus, 
exploration of resources now positions SOEs to be less dependent on firms and countries for resources in 
the future, enhancing the future geopolitical position of the SOE and its home country government. As 
suggested by the Chief Operating Officer of a Canadian international oil company (IOC), “[SOEs] place 
more importance on strategic benefits, in particular, security of national energy supply for the future.” These 
strategic benefits of decreased dependence and enhanced geopolitical position lean SOEs toward 
exploration of resources to further satisfy their political intents. 
Additionally, SOEs tend to be more inefficient and technologically weaker than their NSOE 
counterparts (Gaille, 2010; Mascarenhas, 1989; Musacchio & Flores-Macias, 2009). For SOEs to satisfy 
their business intent of maximizing wealth, the resources acquired must not require efficient operations to 
create value. Resources for exploration do not require the same technical skills and expertise (focused on 
search and discovery) that are required for exploitation (focused on production and efficiency) (Lavie et 
al., 2010; Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). For SOEs, acquiring resources for exploitation only 
exposes the technological weakness and inefficiencies of the firm, which jeopardizes the potential to satisfy 
the SOE’s business intent. For these reasons, we suggest that the extent of state ownership increases the 
likelihood of acquiring resources for exploration.  
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Hypothesis 1. Multinationals with greater state ownership are more likely to acquire resources for 
exploration and less likely to acquire resources for exploitation. 
State ownership influences price paid for resources for exploration. Multinationals pay differential 
amounts for the same resources based on the firm’s valuation as well as the market value of the resource 
(McAfee & McMillan, 1987). A firm’s valuation of a resource is determined by multiple attributes (Chen, 
Liaw, & Leung, 2003), such as the firm’s experience in the geographic area, the firm’s technical 
competence, the firm’s experience with similar deals of similar resources, etc. Market value of the resource 
is determined mainly by supply and demand (McAfee & McMillan, 1987). Thus, in global markets, market 
value is relatively equivalent across countries, and subsequently, for all multinationals. Therefore, firm 
valuation is a more significant driver of differentials in prices paid for resource acquisitions than market 
value.  
SOEs place greater value on acquiring resources for exploration for two reasons. First, they do not 
require efficiency and technical competence (which many SOEs lack and many NSOEs have expertise in) 
(Gaille, 2010; Zif, 1981). Resources for exploitation expose this technical inferiority of SOEs, and threaten 
the business intent of wealth maximization for these firms. Second, exploration of resources is a way for 
the SOE to ensure it has access to resources that can potentially satisfy future demand. Paying more for 
such resources benefits the SOE because exploration of resources helps secure the future of the SOE’s home 
country in terms of national security and geopolitical position (Klein & Robinson, 2011). As stated by an 
executive of a private oil and gas firm in reference to investments in exploration of resources, “[SOEs] 
ascribe a premium to the value…above and beyond the risked economic potential of the investment as seen 
by [NSOEs].” Finally, SOEs tend to be highly-funded, with access to low-cost capital provided from the 
stable backing of their host governments (Katusa, 2012). Thus, access to financial resources to pay a 
premium for exploration of resources is less of a concern for SOEs. This sentiment is echoed in a statement 
from an executive of a Chinese SOE with reference to investments in exploration of resources: “most 
[SOEs] have significant ability to purchase and fund development…They also invest for the long term, and 
are not as concerned about current quarter profit reporting, as public companies are. ” Thus, we argue that, 
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compared to NSOEs, SOEs place higher value on exploration of resources and are willing to pay a premium 
for the same.  
Hypothesis 2. Multinationals with greater state ownership pay higher prices for acquiring 
resources for exploration and lower prices for resources for exploitation.  
Moderators: Target Country’s Resource-Richness and Target Country-Specific Experience 
Moderators of the influence of state ownership on likelihood of acquiring resources for exploration. 
Geographic location can influence environmental complexity, access to resources (Amburgey & Rao., 
1996; Wry et al., 2013), and subsequently the resource acquisition behaviors of multinationals. Because 
SOEs are more likely to acquire resources for exploration, they may look to regions that are resource-rich 
and in which they have previous experience. Resource-rich countries have higher resource potential 
(Almeida & Phene, 2004). That is, these countries have more resources that are currently being exploited 
and/or can be explored for. In a practical sense, these countries have what SOEs want—resources that can 
be explored for now and exploited in the future. Resource-richness is even more important to SOEs because 
of the strategic benefits gleaned from exploration of resources in such countries. For SOEs, satisfying 
business and political intents concurrently is of high priority. Like NSOEs, targeting resource-rich countries 
provides the firm (SOE or NSOE) with the opportunity to explore for resources that can satisfy the business 
intent of wealth maximization. However, unlike NSOEs, SOEs also satisfy political intent when targeting 
resource-rich countries. In doing so, the SOE gains a foothold in countries that can enhance the SOE’s 
geopolitical position and decrease its dependence on other firms and countries for resources. 
Further, target country-specific experience indicates the SOE’s knowledge and familiarity with the 
country. The SOE is more willing to acquire resources in countries in which it has experience. The SOE is 
more familiar with the country and has location-specific knowledge about the country’s resources. Thus, in 
making the decision to acquire the resources, SOEs may be more likely to acquire resources for exploration, 
especially in countries that are resource-rich and in which they have more exploration experience. 
Hypothesis 3a. Multinationals with greater state ownership are much more likely to acquire 
resources for exploration when the target country’s resource-richness is high. 
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Hypothesis 3b. Multinationals with greater state ownership are much more likely to acquire 
resources for exploration when the multinational’s target country-specific experience is high. 
Moderators of the influence of state ownership on price paid for resources for exploration. 
Extending the above argument to prices paid, we suggest that SOEs pay much higher prices for resources 
for exploration when the target country is resource-rich or when the SOE has more target country-specific 
experience. Resource-rich countries offer a highly desirable commodity not only to SOEs, but also to those 
multinationals interested in gaining access to resources for exploration. As such, SOEs want to penetrate 
these resource-rich countries and gain access to these resources to protect the energy security and 
geopolitical position of their home governments. Paying more for resources for exploration in resource-rich 
countries could be worthwhile for at least two reasons. First, SOEs have the option to develop the resources 
in the future at any time of their choosing, perhaps whenever their home country needs the resources the 
most. Second, SOEs have the option of selling the undeveloped resources to other firms who are eager to 
exploit the resources. The potential to exploit resources in the future or sell the resources to others ensures 
the long-term viability of the SOE. Similarly, an SOE may place more value on resources in countries in 
which it has more experience. In these locations, the SOE has more familiarity with the country and 
location-specific knowledge about the country’s resources. This familiarity further enhances the SOE’s 
ability to satisfy political intent of enhanced geopolitical position and power and business intent of wealth 
maximization. In sum, we suggest that SOEs pay much higher prices for resources for exploration both 
when the target country is resource-rich and when the firm’s target country-specific experience is high. 
Hypothesis 4a. Multinationals with greater state ownership pay much higher prices for resources 
for exploration when the target country’s resource-richness is high. 
Hypothesis 4b. Multinationals with greater state ownership pay much higher prices for resources 
for exploration when the target country-specific experience of the multinationals is high. 
HETEROGENEITY AMONG STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 
Not all SOEs operate in the same way. As noted earlier, ownership influences the intent and 
subsequent activities of the firm. That is, to the extent that the state owns the SOE, the SOE operates with 
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an intent that more or less reflects the national agenda of the state. Hence, differing business and political 
intents exist among SOEs (Zif, 1981). For instance, when the SOE adopts a more political orientation, it 
must satisfy the interests of the public including “the public-at-large, political representatives (parties, 
government agencies, etc.) and special interest groups (labor unions, trade organizations, etc.),” (Zif, 1981: 
p. 1328).  
In previous sections, our focus was on comparing SOEs to NSOEs. We hypothesized that SOEs 
are more likely than NSOEs to acquire resources for exploration and pay higher prices for the same. This 
is not to say that SOEs always acquire resources for exploration and never acquire resources for 
exploitation. We focused on differentiating between SOEs and NSOEs in terms of their long- or short-term 
resource security concerns; nonetheless, there is heterogeneity among SOEs in terms of the resources they 
choose to acquire. 
Heterogeneity in the Ratio of Exploration to Exploitation Experience among SOEs 
Although there are differences in competencies between SOEs and NSOEs (Gaille, 2010), 
differences in competencies also exist among SOEs. As indicated above, SOEs tend to be less efficient and 
technologically competent than their NSOE counterparts (Gaille, 2010; Mascarenhas, 1989). However, 
even among SOEs, some are more efficient than others. That is, some SOEs have more technological 
competence and operate more efficiently (Karev, 2013). Among SOEs, those that have developed greater 
technological competence over time in exploitation (i.e. developed skills in production efficiency) are more 
willing to acquire resources for exploitation than those SOEs without these skills. SOEs without these skills 
can afford to secure the resources through exploration. The significance of the development of exploitation 
skills (in addition to exploration skills) is that these SOEs operate less like their other SOE counterparts 
(that are more likely to acquire resources for exploration) and more like their NSOE counterparts (that are 
more likely to acquire resources for exploitation) or a hybrid form of SOE that is equally competent in both 
exploration and exploitation. Thus, we suggest that SOEs that have developed more exploitation experience 
create a unique form of SOE that retains its focus on both political and business intents (Zif, 1981, 1983) 
but operates more like an NSOE in terms of acquiring resources for exploitation. These SOEs are aware 
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that “technology and technical expertise are major factors shaping resource policies” and as such, will be 
“increasingly encouraged to play quasi-governmental roles, but must balance these requirements with 
market expectations” (Karev, 2013: 17). 
Among SOEs, the valuation of the price paid for resources can differ (Chen et al., 2003). The 
valuation is derived from various attributes, which can include the firm’s past experience with similar deals 
for similar resources. SOEs that have participated in more exploration activities in the past have more 
confidence in the benefits of exploration and are willing to pay higher prices and outbid others (especially 
other SOEs) for exploration opportunities. In contrast, SOEs that have participated in fewer exploration 
deals in the past are either inexperienced in these types of deals or possibly have a stronger business intent 
and short-term outlook that favors relatively short-term benefits from exploitation of resources for 
consumption. As such, their valuation of resources that require exploration prior to exploitation is lower. 
To secure the benefits of exploitation, these SOEs are willing to pay higher prices to acquire resources for 
exploitation. This is because these SOEs place a higher valuation of resources for exploitation based on 
previous experience and success and need to satisfy business intent through relatively short-term gains from 
exploitation. Thus, we believe that there is heterogeneity among SOEs in the ratio of their exploration to 
exploitation experience, and we hypothesize that this ratio influences the prices they pay for the resources. 
Hypothesis 5a. Among state owned multinationals, those with higher ratio of exploration to 
exploitation experience pay higher prices for resources for exploration. 
Hypothesis 5b. Among state owned multinationals, those with lower ratio of exploration to 
exploitation experience pay higher prices for resources for exploitation. 
METHODS 
While SOEs are present in a wide variety of industries such as service industries (e.g., banking, 
construction, transportation, etc.), manufacturing industries (e.g., telecommunication, automobile, etc.), and 
utility industries (e.g., hydro, thermal, or nuclear power generation), a critical focus area of governments 
and their SOEs has been on the natural-resource based industries (Büge et al., 2013). Natural-resource based 
industries include metallic minerals (e.g., iron, copper, bauxite, etc.), non-metallic minerals (limestone, 
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quartz, gemstones, etc.), and hydrocarbons (e.g., methane, coal, and petroleum). Among the natural-
resource based industries, the petroleum (i.e. oil and gas) industry has gained special attention of 
governments because the world economy has become heavily dependent on petroleum and consumption 
for these resources in on the rise (Karev, 2013). Securing petroleum resources across the world to safeguard 
the country’s future has become a national priority for many countries (Gaille, 2010; Karev, 2013).   
The setting for this study is the upstream sector of the petroleum industry. The upstream sector of 
the petroleum industry is an appropriate setting for this study because the multinational enterprises in this 
industry sector actively attempt to acquire resources around the world. With regard to ownership types, the 
industry includes SOEs as well as privately-held and publicly-traded NSOEs. SOEs play a major role in 
this industry (Tordo et al., 2011). A more detailed introduction to the petroleum industry is provided in the 
Appendix. 
Data and Procedure 
Our data consists of market-based transactions for petroleum resources by multinational enterprises 
(both SOEs and NSOEs) across the world. We compiled the data from various sources such as company 
websites, annual reports, trade journals, finance portals, industry lists, trade publications, and petroleum 
industry sources that track petroleum transactions(Derrick Petroleum, 2012; PLS, 2012). We focused on 
the period 2005 to 2012. Though thousands of transactions were announced during this period,  a constraint 
we faced is that limited or no data were publicly-available for a large majority of the transactions. Hence, 
we put substantial efforts into identifying transactions with as much non-missing data as possible for the 
variables of interest. Further, while thousands of transactions were announced during the period 2005 to 
2012, only a fraction were cross-border (i.e. transactions where the resource was located in a country that 
was foreign to either the acquirer firm, seller firm, or both firms). Hence, we focused our data collection 
efforts on multinational enterprises involved in such transactions. We were able to collect data on 404 
transactions involving SOEs and NSOEs acquiring petroleum resources across the world. Some of our 
regressions (in the results section) use this entire sample size of 404 market-based transactions while other 
regressions use slightly reduced sample sizes because of missing data in some of the variables in interest. 
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The characteristics of the sample are provided in Table 1. The transaction value, that is the purchase 
price, is USD 787 million on average. The sample consisted of transactions for acquiring resources for 
exploitation (34.9%) and exploration (28.7%). Fifty-eight percent of the transactions in our sample had a 
SOE as an acquirer or seller of resources. We highlight the involvement of SOEs in our sample in Figure 
1, which illustrates a few examples from our sample (of national governments, their SOEs, and their target 
countries).  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Measures of Dependent Variables 
Exploration and exploitation are such essential behaviors for firms operating in the petroleum 
industry that they are a part of the industry’s standard nomenclature (Gaille, 2010; PLS, 2012; SPE, 2007, 
2012). Our binary measures for firms acquiring resources for exploration versus exploitation and our 
continuous measures for the prices paid are described below. The data for these dependent variables are 
from one of the years between 2005 and 2012 (whenever the event, i.e., transaction announcement, 
occurred). 
Acquiring resources for exploration. This dependent variable is measured as a binary variable. It 
has a value of 1 if the transaction type clearly indicates resources for exploration. These are transactions of 
undeveloped resources, or resources that are “expected to be recovered through future investments” (SPE, 
2007: 27). These transactions of undeveloped resources are classified as exploration of resources for the 
first time (new exploration awards), resources that have been awarded but no exploration activity has 
occurred (exploration blocks previously awarded), or exploration of petroleum resources in areas where 
discoveries have previously been made, but have not been developed and put into production (discoveries 
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not yet under development) (PLS, 2012). It has a value of 0 for all other transaction types, such as those 
indicating exploitation or those that do not clearly fall in the category of either exploration or exploitation 
(e.g., mix of various asset types, corporate M&A, or fields under development).  
When a firm acquires petroleum resources for exploration, it cannot immediately start generating 
returns from the resources. This is because the resources (i.e., fields) cannot be exploited (production-
related activities) until they have initially been explored (exploration-related activities) and successfully 
developed into producible fields. Hence, the main benefit of acquiring resources for exploration is that it 
provides the firm with a long-term reserve of unexploited resources that could be used in the future (SPE, 
2007). 
Price paid for acquiring resources for exploration. We use two proxies to measure the price paid 
to acquire resources for exploration: (i) value of undeveloped acres purchased, and (ii) deal value per unit 
acre for exploration (PLS, 2012; SPE, 2012).  
First, the value of undeveloped acres purchased is measured as the dollar value of the undeveloped 
portion of the acreage acquired by the multinational. The net undeveloped acreage, in acres, refers to the 
lease acreage on which wells have not been completed to a point of testing or allowing production (SPE, 
2012). The dollar value of this acreage, as evaluated by the firm and auditors, provides the measure of the 
price paid to acquire resources for exploration (Crawford, 1970; Lin, Peng, Yang, & Sun, 2009).  
Second, the price per unit acre for exploration is measured as the total purchase price (amount in 
$) divided by portion of acreage available for exploration. This measure incorporates how much was paid 
in total for the deal (in $) as the numerator, divided by the amount of area (in acres) that can be used for 
exploration. The ratio, in dollars per acre, is used as another measure of the price paid to acquire resources 
for exploration (PLS, 2012). 
Acquiring resources for exploitation. This dependent variable is measured as a binary variable. It 
has a value of 1 if the transaction type clearly indicates resources for exploitation. These are transactions 
of developed resources, or resources of “expected quantities to be recovered from existing wells and 
facilities.”(SPE, 2007: 27). These transactions of developed resources are classified as operation of fields 
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in geographic areas where petroleum resources have been found and are currently in production (producing 
fields), or in geographic areas that were once producing, but operation of these fields has previously ceased 
and has since been revitalized (redevelopment fields) (PLS, 2012). It has a value of 0 for all other transaction 
types, such as those indicating exploration or those that do not clearly fall in the category of either 
exploration of exploitation. Once a firm acquires petroleum resources for exploitation, it can generate 
returns from the resources through production (Gaille, 2010; He & Wong, 2004). 
Price paid for acquiring resources for exploitation. We use two proxies to measure the price paid 
to acquire resources for exploitation: (i) transaction premium for proved and probable reserves, and (ii) 
transaction value per unit of production (PLS, 2012; SPE, 2012).  
First, the premium paid for proved and probable reserves is measured as a ratio minus the average 
of that ratio for all transactions made that year. Specifically, it is the [purchase price in $ / sum of proved 
and probable reserves in barrels of oil equivalent] for the focal transaction minus the average of the 
[purchase price in $ / sum of proved and probable reserves in barrels of oil equivalent] for all petroleum 
transactions that were made that year around the world by various parties. This difference reflects the extent 
to which the firm paid a premium (difference is a positive value) or a discount (difference is a negative 
value). The denominator of the ratio, proved and probable reserves, is calculated as the net reserves 
expected to accrue to the firm after the host government takes its share under a production sharing 
agreement/contract (PLS, 2012). Technically, “proved reserves are those quantities of petroleum, which by 
analysis of geoscience and engineering data, can be estimated with reasonable certainty to be commercially 
recoverable, from a given date forward, from known reservoirs and under defined economic conditions, 
operating methods, and government regulations,” (SPE, 2007: p. 28).  
Second, the price per unit of production is measured as the purchase price (amount in $) divided 
by the daily production (i.e., daily extraction, in barrels of oil equivalent) from the purchased asset. This 
measure incorporates how much was paid in total (in $) as the numerator, divided by the volume of actual 
crude petroleum (oil and natural gas) extraction each day. The denominator refers to the net production 
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expected to accrue to the firm after the host government takes its share under a production sharing 
agreement/contract (PLS, 2012).  
Measures of Independent Variables 
We lag the independent variables behind the dependent variables to indicate the longitudinal 
direction of the influence being tested. While the data for the dependent variables are from one of the years 
between 2005 and 2012, the corresponding data for independent variables ‘extent of state ownership’ and 
‘target country’s resource-richness’ are from the years 2002 to 2009. Results of regressions are similar 
when alternative lag periods (such as one, two, or four years) are used. The data for independent variables 
‘firm’s target country-specific experience’ and ‘firm’s ratio of exploration to exploitation experience’ are 
from the five years preceding the date of the focal purchase transaction. 
Extent of state ownership. This is measured as the percentage of equity shares of the multinational 
that is owned by the national government of the multinational’s home country.  
Target country’s resource-richness. The target country’s resource-richness is measured, in dollars, 
as the ratio of the value of the stock of energy resources to the remaining reserve lifetime. It covers coal, 
crude oil, and natural gas. It is equivalent to the product of unit resource rents and the physical quantities 
of energy extraction in the country. Data are obtained from the World Bank, which collects the data from 
various sources such as the OECD, British Petroleum, IEA, International Petroleum Encyclopedia, UN, and 
national sources (World Bank, 2011).  
Firm’s target country-specific experience. A multinational firm’s target country-specific 
experience is measured in terms of frequency of past involvement in the target country. That is, the number 
of purchase transactions in the target country during the five years preceding the date of the focal purchase 
transaction.  
Firm’s ratio of exploration to exploitation experience. This ratio is measured in terms of relative 
frequency of past involvement in exploration versus exploitation across the world. It is calculated as the 
number of purchases of resources for exploration divided by the number of purchases of resources for 
exploitation during the five years preceding the date of the focal transaction.  
 Page 21 of 46 
 
Measures of Control Variables 
Dummy variables for year of transaction. Dummy variables are created to control for the year in 
which the transaction was announced. The relevant period in our sample ranges from 2005 to 2012. This 
period has been a turbulent time for the global economy, with earlier years being mostly favorable for the 
global economy and later years being mostly unfavorable. 
 Dummy variables for region where resource is located. Dummy variables are created to control 
for ten global regions where the resource (field, well, etc.) being acquired is located. The ten global regions 
are listed in Table 1. By including dummy variables for the regions, we attempt to control for numerous 
extraneous factors (e.g., political and civic unrest, infrastructure, geological features, extraction difficulties, 
etc.) that can contribute to differences across locations (Holditch & Ayers, 2009).  
Hydrocarbon source. This is a binary variable that accounts for whether the hydrocarbon is 
conventional (e.g., oil, gas, and coal) or unconventional (e.g., tight sands, coalbed, and shale) (Holditch & 
Ayers, 2009; SPE, 2012). Compared to conventional resources, unconventional resources are more difficult 
to extract and require more technological capabilities (Holditch & Ayers, 2009).  
Foreign direct investment. This is measured as ratio of the foreign direct investment inflow to gross 
domestic product of the target country (World Bank, 2011). Inflow of FDI is both an indication of, and a 
contributor to, better investment climates, and hence we control for the same.  
RESULTS 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for our study. Logistic regressions are 
used to test hypotheses where the dependent variables are binary. These are hypotheses 1, 3a, and 3b. OLS 
regressions are used to test the hypotheses where the measures of the dependent variables are continuous. 
These are hypotheses 2, 4a, 4b, 5a, and 5b. The regressions results are presented in Tables 3 to 5. For 
obtaining the regression results presented, all the independent variables were centered and standardized. 
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Further, as explained in the measures section, we took advantage of the availability of longitudinal data to 
lag the independent variables behind the dependent variables.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Competition between State Owned and Non-State Owned Enterprises for Resources 
Likelihood of acquiring resources for exploration versus exploitation. The hypotheses related to 
the extent of state ownership of multinationals and their decisions to acquire resources for 
exploration/exploitation are supported. Consistent with hypothesis 1, the extent of state ownership has a 
significantly positive influence on the probability of a multinational deciding to acquire resources for 
exploration (β = 0.24 with p < 0.01 in model A2 of Table 3). Additionally, the extent of state ownership 
has a significantly negative influence on the probability of a multinational deciding to acquire resources for 
exploitation (β = -0.26 with p < 0.001 in model B2 of Table 3). The findings suggest that, when comparing 
SOEs to NSOEs, SOEs are more likely to acquire resources for exploration, and NSOEs are more likely to 
acquire resources for exploitation.  
To contextualize this finding, we provide supportive examples from our data. Consider Australia 
as the destination country where resources were bought. We find that many SOEs bought resources for 
exploration in Australia; for example, CNOOC (100% owned by China) in 2010 and 2012, Statoil (67% 
owned by Norway.) in 2012, Petrobras (54% owned by Brazil) in 2010, and ENI (30.3% owned by Italy) 
in 2011. In comparison, we find that many NSOEs bought resources for exploitation in Australia; for 
example, Itochu (Japan) in 2007, Sojitz (Japan) in 2008, and Vermilion Energy (Canada) in 2007. Similarly, 
consider Canada as the destination country where fields were bought. Again, we find that SOEs tended to 
buy resources for exploration in Canada; for example Sinopec (100% owned by China) in 2005 and Korea 
Gas (27% owned by South Korea) in 2010. In comparison, we find that NSOEs tended to buy resources for 
exploitation in Canada; for example, Centrica (Britain) in 2010 and Quicksilver (USA) in 2010.  
------------------------------- 
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Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
Price paid by SOEs versus NSOEs for resources for exploration versus exploitation. The 
hypotheses related to the extent of state ownership of multinationals and the prices paid to acquire resources 
for exploration/exploitation are supported. Consistent with hypothesis 2, the extent of state ownership has 
a significantly positive influence on the price paid to acquire resources for exploration (β = 0.16 with p < 
0.01 in model C2 and β = 0.18 with p < 0.001 in model D2 of Table 4). Additionally, the extent of state 
ownership has a significantly negative influence on the price paid to acquire resources for exploitation (β 
= -0.23 with p < 0.001 in model E2 and β = -0.16 with p < 0.01 in model F2 of Table 4). The findings 
suggest that, when comparing SOEs to NSOEs, SOEs tend to pay higher prices than NSOEs to acquire 
resources for exploration, and NSOEs tend to pay higher prices than SOEs to acquire resources for 
exploitation. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Moderators of the influence on the likelihood of acquiring resources for exploration. Consistent 
with hypotheses 3a and 3b, the influence of state ownership on the probability of acquiring resources for 
exploration is moderated by the target country’s resource-richness (β = 0.14 with p = 0.06 in model A3 of 
Table 3) and the firm’s target country-specific experience (β = 0.20 with p < 0.05 in model A4 of Table 3). 
Figure 2 provides the interaction plots (the moderator variables are continuous, but only lines representing 
high, mean, and low values of the moderators are plotted for ease of visualization). As shown in the 
interaction plots in Figure 2, the influence of state ownership on the probability of a multinational acquiring 
resources for exploration is more strongly positive both when the target country’s resource-richness is high 
and when the firm’s target country-specific experience is high. The findings suggest that, when these 
moderator variables are high, SOEs are much more likely than NSOEs to acquire resources for exploration. 
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Moderators of the influence on the price paid for resources for exploration. Consistent with 
hypotheses 4a and 4b, the influence of the state ownership on the price paid to acquire resources for 
exploration is moderated by the target country’s resource-richness (β = 0.28 with p < 0.001 in model C3 
and β = 0.23 with p < 0.001 in model D3 of Table 4) and the firm’s target country-specific experience (β = 
0.18 with p < 0.001 in model C4 and β = 0.21 with p < 0.001 in model D4 of Table 4). As shown in the 
interaction plots in Figure 4, the influence of state ownership on the price paid to acquire resources for 
exploration is more strongly positive both when the target country’s resource-richness is high and when the 
firm’s target country-specific experience is high. The findings suggest that, when these moderator variables 
are high, SOEs pay much higher prices than NSOEs to acquire resources for exploration. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Heterogeneity among SOEs 
Highlighting heterogeneity among SOEs, we find that the ratio of exploration to exploitation 
experience of an SOE has a significant influence on the price paid by the SOE to acquire resources for 
either exploration or exploitation. Consistent with hypothesis 5a, the ratio of exploration to exploitation 
experience of SOEs has a significantly positive influence on the prices the SOEs pay to acquire resources 
for exploration (β = 0.16 with p < 0.05 in model G2 and β = 0.30 with p < 0.001 in model H2 of Table 5). 
Consistent with hypothesis 5b, the ratio of exploration to exploitation experience of SOEs has a 
significantly negative influence on the prices the SOEs pay to acquire resources for exploitation (β = -0.25 
with p < 0.001 in model I2 and β = -0.23 with p < 0.05 in model J2 of Table 5). The findings suggest 
evidence of heterogeneity among SOEs. On the one hand, SOEs that have a higher ratio of exploration to 
exploitation experience pay higher prices to outbid other SOEs to acquire resources for exploration. On the 
other hand, SOEs that have a lower ratio of exploration to exploitation experience pay higher prices to 
outbid other SOEs to acquire resources for exploitation. 
CONCLUSION 
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SOEs are pushing the boundaries across industries in international markets. They play a major role 
in globally competitive industries by acquiring resources that will secure their and their home countries’ 
futures. This study demonstrates that governments, via SOEs, play the role of enablers of cross-border 
business activity. By acquiring resources in foreign countries, SOEs reduce their country’s future 
dependence on importing resources from foreign entities. By becoming more resource independent, the 
SOEs and the home countries also become positioned to be more geopolitically powerful in the future.  
SOEs that invest abroad to acquire resources operate at the crucial intersection between the political 
economy and international business, and our study offers insights into the same. Specifically, it offers 
insights into how home countries encourage SOEs to invest abroad to acquire resources in support of 
national priorities. Our results suggest that many governments encourage SOEs to acquire resources in 
foreign countries with the future resource security of their countries in mind. For instance, the government 
of China has facilitated its SOEs to acquire petroleum resources from the international market (Mehta, 
2013), not necessarily for immediate benefits, but as a safeguard for the country’s economic and 
geopolitical future. To stay competitive, other governments might need to do the same via their SOEs. This 
ensures that their SOEs do not miss out on opportunities to acquire increasingly important resources. SOEs 
that are constrained rather than encouraged by their home country governments risk falling behind in the 
global race for finite, natural resources.  
Contributions to Theory 
Our study offers several theoretical implications for the literature. First, we examine how 
multinationals, and especially SOEs, secure the future in terms of the resources they acquire. Existing 
conceptualizations of RDT focus on the resources firms need now to be powerful at present (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Wry et al., 2013). The only mention of future firm action is in relation to constraining firm 
behavior: “response to the demands of one group constrains the organization in its future actions” (Pfeffer 
& Nowak, 1976: 43) This study adds to the RDT literature by suggesting that forward-looking valuation of 
resources  is needed. As shown in this study, for some multinationals, acquiring resources that secure the 
firm’s (or home government’s) future is worth more than acquiring resources that are valuable at present. 
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Our research suggests that to secure the future, multinationals must manage their dependence. The more 
acquisition of resources a multinational makes now, the less dependent the multinational and its home 
country will be on foreign entities for resources in the future. Explicitly, securing the future is about 
securing future resource independence. For SOEs, resource independence stems from acquiring resources 
for exploration that can potentially satisfy the future demand and enhance geopolitical position of their 
home countries. It provides SOEs with solace in knowing that they have secured resources that, though not 
yet exploited, could certainly be exploited in the future when the need arises.  
Second, we provide insight into ownership considerations. Many SOEs are actively supported by 
governments of their home countries to invest abroad to acquire resources. We connect the notion of 
differences in ownership orientations to differences in the resources acquired. SOEs have strong stakes in 
pursuing agendas that ensure future prospects, energy and economic security, and geopolitical position. 
SOEs also operate as capitalist, foreign-policy arms of their home country governments. SOEs, operating 
with both political and business intents, are more likely to acquire resources for exploration. Resources for 
exploration fit well with SOEs’ interests and objectives. These resources can be held ‘in reserve’ until the 
SOE either needs to develop them due to demand, or can sell them via market-based transactions. 
Ownership also explains differences in how firms mobilize internal resources to gain access to external 
resources. Once the decision has been made by the firm to acquire external resources, the amount paid for 
the resources is largely related to the ownership of the firm. We find that SOEs are willing to pay higher 
prices than NSOEs for resources for exploration. This means that SOEs find these resources to be more 
valuable due to their political and business intents (Zif). In satisfying their business and political intents, 
SOEs that acquire these resources decrease their future dependence on other firms in the industry and 
provide resource security to their home country.  
Third, we provide insight into the importance of multinational enterprises and the need to encourage 
them to invest abroad to acquire resources. When a multinational enterprise invests abroad, this investment 
outflow might be perceived as a short-term loss for the home country. However, we suggest that investments 
abroad can help the home country in the long-term if it is to acquire resources to secure the country’s future. 
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Apart from reducing future dependence on foreign entities, multinationals also cross borders because of 
political intent. SOEs operate multinationally to gain access to resources in a way that secures the home 
country’s future in terms of economic gains, geopolitical position, and power.  
Finally, our study offers a conceptualization of exploration and exploitation from a resource 
security perspective. Most previous research using the exploration vs. exploitation framework uses the 
resource-based view as a theoretical background (Lavie et al., 2010), and applied it to a wide variety of 
settings including product-based markets (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; McNamara & Baden-Fuller, 2007), 
retail banking and insurance (Flier et al., 2003; Volberda et al., 2001), professional service firms and 
investment banks (Groysberg & Lee, 2009), and theaters (Voss et al., 2008), among others. See Figure 3 
for some examples. All of these and similar studies examine how internal resources are explored or 
exploited. Our contribution lies in our suggestion that exploration vs. exploitation activities can be analyzed 
from a resource security perspective. Acquiring resources for exploration increases long-term resource 
security because it involves securing resources as a safeguard for the future. Acquiring resources for 
exploitation increases relatively short-term security and gains through resource production and 
consumption. We find that SOEs opt for long-term resource security whereas NSOEs tend to opt for shorter-
term security for resource consumption. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
Insights into the complexities of the petroleum industry. SOEs in the petroleum industry (National 
Oil Companies, or NOCs) secure the futures for their home countries. Within this industry, it is largely 
recognized that, “NOCs’ immediate priority is to secure oil supplies” (Karev, 2013: 18). They represent 
nationalism of their home countries while creating and redistributing domestic wealth to their citizens. At 
a fundamental level, then, why do NOCs cross borders and compete abroad? Future energy security stems 
from building an international petroleum resource portfolio (Mehta, 2013). Given the complexity, and at 
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times instability, of the petroleum market, governments can secure their countries’ futures by directing their 
NOCs to acquire petroleum resources in foreign countries. These countries with NOCs feel secure in having 
a globally dispersed petroleum resource portfolio that can be tapped when needed at present or in the future. 
Thus, an investment made abroad is not necessarily a loss of investment at home. An investment abroad in 
terms of acquiring petroleum resources means securing control of these resources now as a safeguard for 
the country’s future. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Heterogeneity in home country’s internal resource demand. The lack of sufficient resources within 
a country to meet the country’s internal demands can make the country dependent on imports from foreign 
entities. Such countries are net importers of resources (Karev, 2013). In order to reduce dependence on 
imports from foreign entities, the governments of these countries are likely to encourage their NOCs to 
invest abroad to acquire the resources in foreign locales. In our sample, as illustrated in Figure 4, this holds 
true for the following countries: China, India, Italy, South Korea, Brazil, and Poland. Select examples of 
NOCs from these countries and their destinations for acquiring resources were illustrated in Figure 1. 
In contrast, there are countries that have more than enough resources to satisfy the countries’ 
internal demands and are therefore not dependent on imports from foreign entities. Such countries are often 
net exporters of resources (Karev, 2013). With abundance of resources at home available for export, the 
governments of such countries do not necessarily need to encourage their NOCs to invest abroad to acquire 
more resources (Marcel, 2006). Accordingly, we observed that numerous NOCs (such as those from 
countries in the Middle East—Aramco of Saudi Arabia, KPC of Kuwait, NIOC of Iran, North Oil Company 
of Iraq, etc.) do not appear in our sample. As illustrated in Figure 4, there are at least 23 countries that are 
net exporters and have NOCs, but their NOCs have not invested abroad to acquire resources.  
The exceptions—net exporters investing abroad to acquire even more resources. There are 
exceptions to the above logic. There are multiple countries that have more than enough resources within 
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their borders to satisfy internal demands and are net exporters of resources. Yet, these countries’ NOCs still 
invest abroad to acquire more resources. As shown in Figure 4, there are at least seven countries that are 
net exporters and yet with NOCs investing abroad: Norway, Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Colombia, 
Russia, Indonesia, and Malaysia.  
Take Russia as an example from this group. NOCs from Russia, including Gazprom and Roseneft, 
are increasingly investing abroad. This is a surprising finding since Russia, as shown in Figure 4, is a net 
exporter. Why are Russian NOCs making cross-border acquisition of petroleum resources despite having 
plentiful resources within the country’s borders? We believe this surprising fact highlights an interesting 
complexity that is only made explicit when studying multinational NOCs. We therefore examined publicly 
available corporate documentation (press releases, presentations, and transcripts from Q&A sessions with 
investors) to understand this complexity further. We found that following a transaction in which Rosneft, a 
Russian NOC, bought resources for exploration in the US from ExxonMobil, an executive from Rosneft 
commented:  
“[Rosneft lays] the foundation for long-term growth of the Russian oil and gas industry…[This] 
unique experience will allow Rosneft to become one of the global leaders in the oil and gas 
industry.”  
 
Similarly, in reference to a transaction in which Gazprom, a Russian NOC, acquired resources for 
exploration in Iraq, an executive for Gazprom commented:  
“Based on our positive experience in cooperation with the Republic of Iraq…the company had 
decided to expand its presence in this country. Carrying out these projects will allow Gazprom… 
to expand its presence abroad.”  
 
By investing abroad to acquire more resources despite their abundance at home, Russian NOCs will have 
many available resources that they can choose to exploit now or wait to exploit in the future. If Russian 
NOCs continue to explore for resources within their own borders and increase their presence abroad in 
terms of resource acquisitions, in the future, other countries (and their NOCs and IOCs) may be dependent 
on Russia (and Russian NOCs) to access these resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Further, investments 
in resources for exploration by Russian NOCs (and other NOCs) abroad also enhance geopolitical position 
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of the home country. For example, since 2005, Russian NOCs have invested in resources acquisitions in 
countries such as Iraq, Libya, and Venezuela, which are of major geopolitical concern to the world. 
Finally, in the last few decades, most of these net exporting countries—Norway, United Arab 
Emirates, Algeria, and Russia—have created sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) from revenues from the export 
of petroleum resources. Norway’s “Government Pension Fund” has assets of more than $800 billion, UAE’s 
“Abu Dhabi Investment Authority” and other smaller SWFs have combined assets of more than $800 
billion, Russia’s “National Welfare Fund”, “Reserve Fund”, and “Russian Direct Investment Fund” have 
combined assets of more than $185 billion, and Algeria’s “Revenue Regulation Fund” has assets of more 
than $75 billion {SWF, 2013}. Governments direct their SWFs to channel financial capital into 
international investments that directly or indirectly help NOCs acquire petroleum resources across the 
world. The presence and influence of SWFs in the acquisition of petroleum resources highlights another 
complexity in the global petroleum industry. 
The dominance of Chinese NOCs. Both China and Russia have substantial amounts of petroleum 
resources within their borders. However, unlike Russia, China is a net importer. This is because, as 
illustrated by the energy use and GDP numbers in Figure 4, the demand for resources within China is very 
high and the resources within China’s borders are not sufficient. China is projected to increase its demand 
for natural gas alone by over 300% over the next 20 years (Karev, 2013). For Chinese NOCs, investing 
abroad to acquire resources is not just about securing the future in terms of geopolitical position and 
power—it is also about securing the future in terms of the need to satisfy future demand. We see this 
sentiment reflected in the headlines related to Sinopec, a Chinese NOC, that spent over $20 billion acquiring 
resources for exploration in just the nine months from March to December 2010: Mar 28— ‘Sinopec 
acquires interest in Angola Block 18 from parent for $2.5B’, Apr 12— ‘ConocoPhillips sells interest in 
Syncrude Project to Sinopec for $4.65B’, Aug 18— ‘Hupecol sells interests in four Llanos Basin blocks to 
Sinopec for $281M’, Aug 31— ‘Sinopec acquires 50% interest in Kazakhstan project from Mittal 
Investments for $1.4B’, Oct 1— ‘Sinopec acquires 40% interest in Repsol’s Brazilian business for $7.1B’, 
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Dec 2— ‘Sinopec acquires 18% interest in Gendalo-Gehem project from Chevron for $680M’, and Dec 
10— ‘Sinopec acquires Argentina unit of Oxy for $2.5B’. 
 Our data suggest that Chinese NOCs are acquiring resources wherever possible: Angola, Argentina, 
Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Libya, Nigeria, Russia, 
Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK, and USA. This also indicates that their 
competitors—IOCs and other NOCs—may experience stiff competition, possibly resulting in bidding wars 
for resources across the world. 
Limitations and Future Research 
We acknowledge limitations of our current study that can be addressed by future research. First, 
essentially there are three categorizations of competition—SOEs vs. NSOEs, SOEs vs. SOEs, and NSOEs 
vs. NSOEs. In this paper, we examine two of these categorizations (SOEs vs. NSOEs, SOEs vs. SOEs). 
Because our study focuses on state ownership, it is outside the scope of this paper to examine the 
competition among NSOEs in acquiring resources for exploration or exploitation. Future research not 
specifically focused on SOEs could include this third category of competition—NSOEs vs. NSOEs—and 
examine differences in how these multinationals compete in relation to competition examined in this study 
(SOEs vs. NSOEs, SOEs vs. SOEs).  
Second, future research could examine differences between ownership and control (Musacchio  & 
Sergio G. Lazzarini, in press). Although we focus on ownership in this study, comparing ownership and 
control—for SOEs and NSOEs— could provide more insight into the relationships in this study. 
Additionally, we include an objective measure of target country’s resource-richness in our study. However, 
we acknowledge that evaluative measures can also be used to assess target countries (e.g., evaluation of fit 
with the firms’ existing resource portfolio or cooperative strategies with other firms operating in those 
locations). Future research could combine the objective measures of target country’s resource-richness, as 
included in this study, with more evaluative measures.  
Finally, we acknowledge some countries may be less inviting for SOEs than others. Some host 
country governments may make it more difficult for multinationals to engage in transactions for resources. 
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As such, SOEs, no matter how focused they are on acquiring resources, will still face many difficulties in 
entering and operating in these markets. The role of government not as an owner, but as an approving 
mechanism that foreign acquirers have to face, can be an avenue for future research. 
In sum, this study examines the state ownership phenomenon to develop a new theoretical 
perspective —resource security— that improves our understanding of the complexities associated with 
firms investing to acquire global resources. For SOEs, resource security implies having sufficient resources 
as a safeguard for the future. By acquiring resources with a long-term perspective, SOEs can secure the 
country’s future not only by reducing dependence on foreign entities but also by increasing geopolitical 
position and power of the country.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1.  
Sample characteristics: Market-based transactions for petroleum resources by multinationals 
 
     
 Average Financial and Operations Data of Transactions: Mean  
 Transaction Value, in millions of dollars  787.3  
 Exploration: Value of Undeveloped Acres, in millions of dollars 50.9  
 Exploration: Purchased Acreage Available for Exploration, in acres 825,092.1  
 Exploitation: Net Proved + Probable Reserves, in barrels of oil equivalent 125,903,459.0  
 Exploitation: Daily Production (Extraction), in barrels of oil equivalent 19,910.8  
 Distribution of Transactions by Calendar Year of Announcement: Freq (%)  
 2005 1.5%  
 2006 7.9%  
 2007 17.1%  
 2008 11.9%  
 2009 12.6%  
 2010 21.3%  
 2011 17.3%  
 2012 (first three quarters of year) 10.4%  
 Distribution of Transactions by State Ownership: Freq (%)  
  No State Ownership Involved: Neither Acquirer nor Seller is State Owned 41.8%  
  State Ownership Involved: Either (or Both) Acquirer and Seller is State Owned 58.2%  
 Distribution of Transactions: Exploitation vs Exploration Freq (%)  
  Exploration (New exploration awards, Exploration blocks previously awarded, Discoveries not 
yet under development) 28.7% 
 
  Exploitation (Producing fields, Redevelopment fields) 34.9%  
  Others (Mix of various asset types, Corporate M&A, Fields under development) 36.4%  
 Distribution of Transactions by Hydrocarbon Type: Freq (%)  
 Oil 41.3%  
 Gas 24.5%  
 Oil + Gas 18.8%  
 Coal Bed Methane (CBM) Gas 4.0%  
 Oilsands 2.2%  
 Not specified 9.2%  
 Distribution of Transactions by Regions Where Hydrocarbon Field Being Bought is Located: Freq (%)   
 Africa 9.6%  
 Middle East 2.0%  
 Former Soviet Union 17.6%  
 Asia (Excluding Middle East and Former Soviet Regions) 7.2%  
 Europe’s North Sea 8.7%  
 Rest of Europe (Excluding North Sea and Former Soviet Regions) 1.7%  
 Australia 5.9%  
 North America’s Gulf of Mexico 5.0%  
 North America (Excluding Gulf of Mexico) 30.9%  
 South/Central America 11.4%  
    
Sample size: 404 market-based transactions (events). 
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Table 2.  
Descriptive statistics and correlations: Transactions by multinational enterprises 
 
 Variable Mean Std Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Dependent Variables              
1 Resources for Exploration: resource acquisition 0.29 0.45 1.00           
2 Resources for Exploitation: resource acquisition 0.35 0.48 -0.46 1.00          
3 Price Paid (Exploration): value of undeveloped acres pur. (millions $) 50.91 307.97 -0.03 -0.11 1.00         
4 Price Paid (Exploration): price per unit acre for exploration ($/acre) 360.19 1732.00 -0.05 -0.16 0.65 1.00        
5 Price Paid (Exploitation): premium for proved & probable res. ($/BOE) 4.07 9.99 -0.66 0.40 0.09 -0.09 1.00       
6 Price Paid (Exploitation): price per unit of production ($/BOE) 5.28E+04 6.68E+04 -0.60 0.23 -0.01 -0.04 0.50 1.00      
Control Variables #              
7 Hydrocarbon Source 0.87 0.33 0.12 0.16 -0.38 -0.46 -0.08 -0.30 1.00     
8 Foreign Direct Investment (%) 3.17 3.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.02 1.00    
Independent Variables              
9 Extent of State Ownership in Firm (%) 37.61 41.91 0.18 -0.22 0.13 0.12 -0.33 -0.15 -0.11 -0.01 1.00   
10 Target Country’s Resource-Richness ($) 6.16E+10 6.46E+10 0.19 -0.10 0.26 0.34 -0.29 -0.20 -0.10 -0.09 0.04 1.00  
11 Firm’s Target Country-Specific Experience 2.03 3.75 0.22 -0.14 0.14 0.21 -0.06 -0.13 -0.12 -0.03 -0.01 0.50 1.00 
12 Firm’s Ratio of Exploration to Exploitation Experience 0.86 1.85 0.17 -0.17 0.28 0.39 -0.27 -0.17 -0.17 -0.10 0.17 0.28 0.39 
# Additional control variables that are used in this study but not reported above are: dummy variables for Year of Transaction [2005 to 2012] and dummy 
variables for Region Where Field is Located [Africa, Middle East, former Soviet Union, Asia (excluding Middle East and former Soviet regions), Europe’s North 
Sea, rest of Europe (excluding North Sea and former Soviet regions), Australia, North America’s Gulf of Mexico, North America (excluding Gulf of Mexico), 
South/Central America]
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Table 3. 
Logistic regressions: Resource acquisition is influenced by extent of state ownership 
 
 Logistic Regressions: Standardized Parameter Estimates β 
Dependent variables: Acquire Resources … 
 … for Exploration … for Exploitation 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 
Controls        
     Dummy Variables for Year       
     Dummy Variables for Region       
     Hydrocarbon Source 0.17† 0.26**  0.33**  0.33**  0.28*** 0.21* 
     Foreign Direct Investment -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 
Predictors       
H1:  Extent of State Ownership  0.24**  0.28**  0.36***  -0.26*** 
Moderators and Interaction Effects       
         Target Country’s Resource-Richness    0.15†     
         Firm’s Target Country Specific Experience    0.31***   
H3a: (Extent of State Ownership ×  
         Target Country’s Resource-Richness) 
   0.14†   
  
H3b: (Extent of State Ownership ×  
         Firm’s Target Country Specific Experience) 
   0.20* 
  
Prediction Accuracy (% Concordant) 75.6% 76.9% 77.3% 80.7% 67.7% 71.0% 
Pseudo (Nagelkerke) R-square 0.241 0.267 0.289 0.363 0.136 0.174 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2  













Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test:   χ2 













*** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, † p ≤ 0.10 (conservative two-tailed tests) 
Sample size = 404 transactions (events). Sample consists of purchase transactions by both SOEs and NSOEs, because the hypotheses compare SOEs to NSOEs. 
Dependent variable is with regard to events (announcements of transactions) between the years 2005 and 2012. Independent variables are lagged behind the 
dependent variable. Independent variables are centered (mean = 0) and standardized. Max VIF = 1.28, indicating no evidence of multicollinearity. Results are 
very similar when independent variables are winsorized at 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles, which indicates that the results are not influenced by outliers.   
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Table 4. 
OLS regressions: Price paid for resources is influenced by extent of state ownership 
 
OLS Regressions: Standardized Parameter Estimates β 
Dependent variables: Price Paid for Resources … 
 … for Exploration … for Exploitation 
 
Value of undeveloped  
acres purchased 
Price paid per unit acre available 
for exploration 
Premium paid for  
proved & probable 
 reserves 
Price paid per unit of 
production 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 E1 E2 F1 F2 
Controls             
     Dummies for Year             
     Dummies for Region             
     Hydrocarbon Source -0.40*** -0.36***  -0.26***  0.24*** -0.46*** -0.41***  0.32***  0.38*** -0.06  -0.11 -0.24*** -0.28*** 
     Foreign Direct Investment -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09† -0.09† -0.04 -0.07  0.00   0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Predictors             
H2: Extent of State Ownership   0.16** 0.25*** 0.24***  0.18*** 0.24*** 0.27***  -0.23***  -0.16** 
Moderators and Interaction Effects             
   Target Country’s Resource-Richness   0.25 ***    0.31***      
   Target Country Specific Experience    0.09†    0.15**     
H4a: (Extent of State Ownership ×  
    Target Country’s Resource-
Richness) 
  0.28 ***    0.23***  
    
H4b: (Extent of State Ownership ×  
    Target Country Specific Experience) 
   0.18***    0.21*** 







































































*** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, † p ≤ 0.10  
Sample sizes: 369 transactions (events) for models C1 to C4, 361 for models D1 to D4, 276 for models E1 and E2, and 319 transactions (events) for models F1 
and F2. Samples consist of purchase transactions by both SOEs and NSOEs, because the hypotheses compare SOEs to NSOEs. Variations in sample sizes are due 
to missing data for variables. Dependent variable is with regard to events (announcements of transactions) between the years 2005 and 2012. Independent 
variables are lagged behind the dependent variable. Variables are centered (mean = 0) and standardized. Max VIF = 1.21, indicating no evidence of 
multicollinearity. Results are very similar when independent variables are winsorized at 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles, which indicates that the results are not 
influenced by outliers.  
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Table 5.  
Heterogeneity in Ratio of Exploration to Exploitation Experience among SOEs Influences the Prices Paid 
 
 
OLS Regressions: Standardized Parameter Estimates β 
Dependent variables: Price Paid by SOE for Resources … 





Price paid per unit acre 
 available for 
exploration 
Premium paid for  
proved & probable 
reserves 
Price paid per 
unit  
of production 
 G1 G2 H1 H1 I1 I2 J1 J2 
Controls         
     Dummies for Year         
     Dummies for Region         
     Hydrocarbon Source -0.30* -0.27* -0.30** -0.25*  0.07  0.08 -0.40** -0.43** 
     Foreign Direct Investment -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04  0.09  0.07  0.01 0.00 
Predictors         















































*** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05, † p ≤ 0.10  
Sample sizes: 168 transactions (events) for models G1 and G2, 163 for models H1 and H2, 111 for models I1 and I2, and 134 transactions (events) for models J1 and J2. Samples 
consist of purchase transactions by SOEs only, because the hypotheses are about heterogeneity among SOEs. Variations in sample sizes are due to missing data for variables. 
Dependent variable is with regard to events (announcements of transactions) between the years 2005 and 2012. Independent variables are lagged behind the dependent variable. 
Variables are centered (mean = 0) and standardized. Max VIF = 1.21, indicating no evidence of multicollinearity. Results are very similar when independent variables are 
winsorized at 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles, which indicates that the results are not influenced by outliers. 
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Figure 1. 
Select examples of governments, their SOEs, and their global destinations (target countries) for acquiring petroleum resources 
 
Govt. of United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
 SOEs: Mubadala, ENOC 
Destinations: Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Libya, Tanzania, Turkmenistan 
Govt. of Italy 
















Govt. of S Korea 
 SOEs: KNOC, Korea Gas 
Destinations: Australia, 
Canada, Congo, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Nigeria,  
Peru, Somalia 
Govt. of India 
 SOEs: ONGC, Indian Oil, Oil India 
Destinations: Azerbaijan, Colombia, 
Egypt, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Libya, 
Nigeria, Russia, Syria, USA, Venezuela 
Govt. of Indonesia 




Govt. of Brazil 




Govt. of Malaysia 






Govt. of Poland 




Govt. of Norway 
 SOE: Statoil 
Destinations: Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, 






































Govt. of Columbia 







Govt. of China 




Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, 
Chad, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Libya, Nigeria, Russia, 
Syria, Trinidad And 
Tobago, Turkmenistan, 
Uganda, UK, USA Serbia 
Somalia 
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Figure 2. 
Interaction plots: Influence of state ownership on the acquisition of resources for exploration 
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Figure 3. Exploration versus exploitation in the literature: Theories and industry proxies 
 
Figure 3a. Theories 
Theoretical Perspective Exploration Exploitation 
Resource Dependence Theory 
(reducing dependency on 
external resources) 
Increase power and reduce dependency by acquisition of 
external resources that are available for exploration 
Increase power and reduce dependency by acquisition of 
external resources that are available for exploitation 
Resource Based View 
(utilizing internal resources) 
Exploration of internal resources allows for eventual 
exploitation of the internal resources 
Exploitation of internal resources  helps improve 
performance 
Resource Security 
(acquiring external resources) 
Resources are secured to enhance long-term resource 
security as a safeguard for the future 
Resources are secured for immediate benefits gained from 
resource consumption 
 
Figure 3b. Industry Proxies 
 Proxies for Operationalization 
Industry Exploration Exploitation 
Product-Based Industries  
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; 
McNamara & Baden-Fuller, 2007) 
R&D / Learning / Experimenting Commercialization/Manufacturing 
Retail Banking/ Insurance  
(Flier, Bosch, & Volberda, 2003; 
Volberda, van den Bosch, Flier, & 
Gedajlovic, 2001) 
Entering new markets and product/service innovation 




(McNamara & Baden-Fuller, 2007) 
Funding new ventures for new products/services that are 
not currently available 
Funding new or existing ventures for refinement of 
existing products/services 
Professional service firms  
(Groysberg & Lee, 2009) 
Initiate new analyses of sectors in which the firm has 
performed no previous research 
Analyze a sector in which the firm has already established 
research 
Theaters  
(Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 2008) 
Creation of new-to-the-world plays and the injection of 
creative new forms of artistic expression 
Incrementally modified/refined productions from the 
existing canon of plays 
Petroleum Industry 
(this study) 
Exploring for petroleum on land that is made available for 
exploration for the first time, on awarded land where no 
exploration activity has occurred, or in areas where 
discoveries have previously been made, but have not been 
developed and put into production 
Operation of fields in geographic areas where petroleum 
has been found and are currently in production, or in 
geographic areas that were once producing, but operation 
of these fields has previously ceased and has since been 
revitalized 
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Figure 4. Home countries of SOEs: Net importers, energy use, GDP, and foreign resource acquisitions 
 
Net energy imports (% of energy use): [(energy use – production) / energy use]; positive = net importer; negative = net exporter. 
Energy use: in 104 kt of oil equivalent; indigenous production plus imports and stock, minus exports. 
GDP: Gross domestic product in 1010 dollars using purchasing power parity rates.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Petroleum Industry 
 
Strategy for firms in the petroleum industry involves business, engineering, geological, legal, and 
even political considerations. The petroleum industry is separated into three sectors: upstream, midstream, 
and downstream. The upstream sector involves exploration and exploitation (production) (E&P) of 
petroleum resources. Par with industry nomenclature, exploitation and production are used synonymously. 
Petroleum resources include both oil and gas. Oil is defined as “the portion of petroleum that exists in the 
liquid phase in natural underground reservoirs and remains liquid at atmospheric conditions of pressure and 
temperature” (SPE, 2007). Gas (sometimes referred to as natural gas), is defined as “the portion of 
petroleum that exists either in the gaseous phase or is in solution in crude oil in natural underground 
reservoirs, and which is gaseous at atmospheric conditions of pressure and temperature” [Reference: (SPE, 
2007)]. Petroleum resources maintain functioning of developed countries—by fueling cars, heating 
buildings, and driving communication and transportation. These resources also help developing countries 
continue to develop—by generating electricity, providing energy for infrastructure, and fueling industrial 
activities (Sagar, 2005). Because of their value to both developed and developing countries, petroleum 
resources are elemental to national policies and competitiveness (Pirog, 2007; Schwab et al., 2009). Further, 
the location of these resources contributes to national wealth and energy security (Bradshaw, 2009).  
There are only a few non-OPEC countries that are energy independent—among them Russia, 
Canada, and Australia (Katusa, 2012). For these countries, the goal is to alter “fiscal structures and 
ownership rules so as to glean as much benefit as possible from their riches, while still reserving sufficient 
supplies to fuel their futures,” (Katusa, 2012). For every other country that is not energy independent, 
however, there are essentially two major priorities: (i) meet current demands for petroleum by importing 
from foreign suppliers, and (ii) secure the country’s future by taking actions to reduce dependence on 
foreign suppliers—such as by acquiring the resources in foreign countries (EIA, 2012b).  
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